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LAWYERING IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE
ROLE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL*
Rex E. Lee
The history of the Office of Solicitor General of the United States
actually begins at least eight decades before that office came into exist-
ence. It begins with the solicitor general's boss, the attorney general.
The attorney general was one of the first four cabinet offices established
by the first Congress. But the attorney general differed from the other
three cabinet officers in several respects that are germane to this discus-
sion. First, his office was created by the Judiciary Act of 1789. Thus,
while the attorney general is beyond question a member of the executive
branch of government, from the very beginning, the closeness of his office
and his function to the Article III branch have been reflected in our stat-
utes. A second difference, of lesser relevance, but nonetheless interesting,
is that the attorney general's annual salary, $1500, was half that of the
other cabinet officers. The assumption was that this was appropriate be-
cause he would continue to carry on a private practice.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 required that the attorney general be "[a]
meet person, learned in the law," whose statutory duties were: "(1) to
prosecute and conduct all suits in the Supreme Court in which the
United States shall be concerned, and (2) to give his advice and opinion
upon questions of law when required by the president of the United
States, or when requested by the heads of any of the departments, touch-
ing any matters that may concern their departments." [1 Stat. 93.]
Thus, from the beginning, the attorney general's first responsibility,
identified by statute, was to represent the United States in the Supreme
Court. In those early years that was not quite the demanding task that it
is today. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792) appears to be only the sec-
ond substantive decision by the Court.
"The very first case of very great importance to come before the
Supreme Court"' was Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 Dall. 419 (1793). That case,
appropriately enough, was argued by the very first Attorney General,
Edmund Randolph. But he argued it in his private capacity, and not as
Attorney General. Indeed, he represented the non-governmental client,
* Reprinted from 1985 Sup. Cr. HIsT. Soc'Y Y.B. 15.
1. Easby-Smith, "Edmund Randolph Trail Blazer," 12 Journal of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia, 415, 426 (1945).
1059
1060 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:1059
Chisolm, and "helped convince the Justices the states could be sued in
the federal courts-a point which the people reversed by the Eleventh
Amendment to the Constitution.2 Easby-Smith, in Edmund Randolph,
Trail Blazer, supra, at 426 wrote that:
Randolph made a brilliant argument in support of his motion
[to enter a default judgment against Georgia, which did not ap-
pear] and the Supreme Court sustained all his contentions,
holding that under the second section of Article III of the Con-
stitution a State might be sued by an individual citizen of any
other State, and in such suit judgment might be entered in de-
fault of an appearance. The argument of Randolph and the de-
cision of the court brought down upon both a shower of abuse
from the anti-federalists throughout the country, and in answer
to popular clamor the Congress, on December 2nd, 1793,
adopted the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution, which
was subsequently ratified.
Perhaps the foremost government case from the early years is Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). That case, argued
by Attorney General William Wirt,4 with assistance from Daniel Web-
ster, established the fundamental proposition that the powers of Con-
gress are not to be construed narrowly. Chief Justice Marshall wrote for
the Court that "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
2. Cummings & McFarland, Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice and the
Federal Executive, 31 (1937). Another landmark early case argued by an Attorney General in
his private capacity was Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819), in
which William Wirt appeared for the College along with Daniel Webster. The Court in that
case, again by Chief Justice Marshall, held that an act of the New Hampshire legislature pur-
porting to make the College a state institution materially changed the charter of the College,
impaired the obligation of the charter and thus was unconstitutional and void.
3. Easby-Smith, in "Edmund Randolph, Trail Blazer," supra, at 416 wrote that Ran-
dolph "ignored personal abuse and quietly accepted an amendment to the Constitution which
was aimed at him and nullified one of his greatest victories in the Supreme Court."
4. Wirt, himself a Marylander by birth, was "[p]robably the most active of the early
Attorneys General, one who held the office for a longer period than any other in the history of
the Government." "Origin and Development of the Office of the Attorney General," H. Doc.
510, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1929). He was our ninth Attorney General, appointed by Presi-
dent Monroe in 1817 and served until 1829. See Easby-Smith, The Department of Justice: Its
History and Functions 45 (1904). It was Wirt who first began the practice of keeping a record
of the Attorney General's opinions and who decided that the Attorney General's opinions
should not be given to all who asked, but only to the President and other Cabinet-level officers.
See id. at 10-11; Cummings & McFarland, Federal Justice: Chapters in the History of Justice
and the Federal Executive, 78-92 (1937). After Wirt's death, John Quincy Adams remarked
that the duties of the Attorney General of the United States... were never more ably or more
faithfully discharged than by Mr. Wirt." Federal Justice, supra, at 78.
June 1988] LAWYERING IN THE SUPREME COURT
adapted to that end, and which are not prohibited . . . are
constitutional."5
To those of us whose personal acquaintance with the Justice Depart-
ment is limited to this century, it is positively astounding to learn that for
the first twenty-seven years, those early attorneys general performed
their tasks with no help of any kind. Not even a clerk. Randolph de-
scribed himself in 1790 as "a sort of mongrel between the State and U.S.;
called an officer of some rank under the latter, and yet thrust out to get a
livelihood in the former."6 Apparently the first request for a clerk came
from Randolph in a letter to President Washington dated December 26,
1791:
I might... add, that the opinions which the Attorney General
gives are many in number and often lengthy. From this consid-
eration, united with the foregoing, the reasonableness of al-
lowing him a transcribing clerk will, I hope, be obvious.7
President Washington sent Randolph's letter to Congress, but to no
avail: "Congress took no action. Twenty-seven years elapsed before any
allowance was made for a clerk." 7[sic] The difficulties faced by the early
attorneys general have been summarized as follows:
No quarters were provided for the Attorney General, and he
was expected to furnish his own quarters, fuel, stationery and
clerk. For this reason the Attorneys General after [Charles]
Lee [who succeeded William Bradford, Randolph's successor
who died in 1795] and until 1814 did not reside permanently in
Washington, but remained at their homes and transmitted their
advice and opinions by mail, going to Washington only when it
became necessary to appear before the Supreme Court.'
Not quite so surprising-but nevertheless surprising---is the fact
that it was not until 1853 that Congress finally established a salary for
5. 17 U.S. at 421.
6. Quoted in Learned, The President's Cabinet Studies in the Origin, Formation, and
Structure of an American Institution, 159 (1912). Randolph, it should be pointed out, after
leaving the government (having served as both Attorney General and Secretary of State) was
Aaron Burr's chief defense counsel in Burr's 1807 treason trial, over which Chief Justice Mar-
shall presided as Circuit Justice. Easby-Smith, in "Edmund Randolph, Trail Blazer," supra, at
429, wrote:
What a scene this trial presented, the most famous in the annals of American crimi-
nal jurisprudence! A former Vice President of the United States on trial for his life,
charged with treason; the great Chief Justice presiding; and [Caesar A.] Rodney and
[William] Wirt, present and future Attorneys General, pitted against Randolph, for-
mer Attorney General; all the chief actors including the defendant himself, who took
part in the arguments, being among the greatest lawyers of their day.
7. Easby-Smith, supra, at 424.
8. Supra, at 7.
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the Attorney General equivalent to that of the other cabinet officers,
thereby bringing to an end the tradition of part-time attorneys general
who kept up a private law practice.9
What is not surprising at all is that at the end of the Civil War, the
nation's legal business, and consequently the demands of the Attorney
General, increased manyfold. The aftermath of the Civil War marks the
single point in our nation's history when the place of federal law vis-a-vis
the laws of the states experienced its greatest expansion. Homer Cum-
mings and Carl McFarland, in their book Federal Justice, describe the
situation as follows:
As the war came to a close and reconstruction began, the
legal business of the government increased. In April 1866,
James Speed, who had been Attorney General less than year
and a half, had written nearly as many opinions as his predeces-
sor had written during three years. For many months the em-
ployees in his office worked more than double the official
number of hours, and Sundays and holidays were unknown to
them.10
In December 1867, Attorney General Stanberry was asked by the
Senate to report on the affairs of his office, and he responded:
As to the mere administrative business of the office, the
present force is sufficient, but as to the proper duties of the At-
torney General, especially in the preparation and argument of
cases before the Supreme Court of the United States and the
preparation of opinions on questions of law referred to him
some provision is absolutely necessary to enable him properly
9. A major preoccupation of the attorneys general in the years leading up to the Civil
War was "[t]he task of supervising appeals in public litigation over the three great bodies of
private land claims, in the Louisiana Territory, the Floridas, and California." Cummings &
McFarland, supra, at 120. Large parcels of land in these territories, which were acquired from
France, Spain, and Mexico, respectively, were claimed by settlers under grants purportedly
given by the French, Spanish and Mexican governments. Documentation was scarce and
many extravagant and fraudulent claims were made. Among these were some eight claims
filed by a Frenchman named Limantour covering a thousand square miles of California, in-
cluding the entire city of San Francisco. Limantour's claims were later exposed as frauds
through the combined efforts of Attorney General Jeremiah Sullivan Black and Edwin M.
Stanton, a "[b]rilliant, industrious, painfully thorough and precise" lawyer, id. at 135-136, who
was hired by Black as special counsel in the California case and later succeeded Black as
Attorney General. These land cases, a number of which reached the Supreme Court, are de-
scribed in detail in Cummings & McFarland, supra, at 120-141.
10. Supra, at 220. The New York Tribune and Harper's Weekly said of Jeremiah Black
that "though you never meet the Attorney General at a ball or soiree, you can find him all day
in the Supreme Court, and nearly all night at his office." Quoted in Cummings & McFarland,
supra, at 159-160.
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to discharge his duties. After much reflection, it seems to me
that this want may best be supplied by the appointment of a
Solicitor General. With such an assistant, the necessity of ap-
pointing special counsel in the argument of cases in the
Supreme Court of the United States, would be, in a great mea-
sure, if not altogether dispensed with.1'
Stanberry's letter appears to contain the first mention of the term
"solicitor general." The name, like so much else in our American system
is of English origin. At first glance, that seems strange, given the well-
known distinction between English barristers and solicitors, and the
equally well-known fact that the dominant characteristic of the solicitor
is that he is the fellow who does not appear in court. Further research
discloses, however, that the phrase is of ancient origin, and that for at
least two reasons, it fairly aptly describes the relationship that Stanberry
envisioned the American solicitor general would bear to the attorney
general.
In the early common law, the parties prosecuted their own suits and
had to be present at all legal proceedings. "The idea that one man can
represent another is foreign to early law. When first it is introduced it is
regarded as an exceptional privilege, and the first representative must be
solemnly appointed."' 2 It was only gradually that agents were allowed
to appear for the parties to represent their interests in litigation."3 These
were "attorneys."
A "solicitor," as Holdsworth explains, was a legal practitioner, simi-
lar to an attorney, whose earliest function appears to have been to assist
the attorney in the preparation of cases for litigation. "Solicitors" were
defined in 1589 as persons who, "'being learned in the Laws, and in-
formed of their Masters Cause, do inform and instruct the Counsellors in
the same.' ",a Originally nothing more than a servant or agent of the
attorney or his client, the solicitor came into his own, professionally
speaking, with the rise of non-common-law courts, especially the Court
of Chancery where attorneys, who were authorized to practice only in
common-law courts, could not appear. 5 Given their humble origins as
11. Cummings & McFarland, Federal Justice, supra, at 222-223.
12. Holdsworth, History of English Law VI, 432.
13. See Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney General, 25 Law Q. Rev., 400-401; Holdsworth,
supra, at 432-433.
14. Quoted in Holdsworth, supra, at 449-450.
15. Id. at 449-451. (Attorneys eventually did gain access to the Court of Chancery as well.
See id. at 455-456.) The other two courts where solicitors practiced were the Court of Re-
quests and the Star Chamber. Holdsworth described how the solicitors came to prominence in
the Court of Chancery, and noted that "[nlo doubt we should have seen a similar phenomenon
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attorneys' assistants, solicitors were long regarded as "'but ministerial
persons and of an inferior nature.'-16 In 1750, solicitors were finally
given admission as attorneys, and "[firom that time onwards we can say
that this new class of practitioners has become substantially amalga-
mated with the attorneys."
17
Similarly, the English solicitor general, both originally and also to-
day, was and is one who assists the attorney general in the discharge of
his responsibilities. In the English system, which is a Parliamentary sys-
tem, both are members of Parliament and are "law officer" members of
the Cabinet. Thus, while there are necessarily differences in their func-
tions, owing principally to the differences between parliamentary and
separation of powers systems of government, the significant similarity is
that on both sides of the Atlantic, the attorney general was and is the
nation's chief legal officer, and the Office of Solicitor General was created
to assist him in that task.
As Stanberry's letter suggests, the practice of hiring private counsel
to argue the government's cases had been growing in the post-war years.
In 1867 alone, the Attorney General reported, the government had spent
more than $6000 for such services. 8 Thus, it was partly out of frugal-
ity, 19 and not entirely out of concern for the effectiveness of the attorney
general's operations that Congress in 1870 enacted legislation establish-
ing the Department of Justice and creating the Office of Solicitor Gen-
eral. The Act provided in part that:
there shall be in said Department an officer learned in the law,
to assist the Attorney General in the performance of his duties,
to be called the Solicitor General, and who in case of a vacancy
in the office of the Attorney General, or in his absence or disa-
bility, shall have power to exercise all the duties of that office.
My reading of what happened during the early years of the solicitor
general's office leads me to conclude that the distinction between the re-
sponsibilities of the attorney general and the solicitor general was not as
cleanly defined as it is today. The evidence is strong that the first two
in the case of the Court of Requests and the Star Chamber if those courts had survived. But
they did not survive. Therefore the solicitor came to be associated mainly with the Court of
Chancery." Id. at 455456.
16. Quoted in Holdsworth, supra, at 440.
17. Id. at 457.
18. Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 3038 (April 27, 1870).
19. Congress' fiscal motivation is reflected in the fact that the legislation establishing the
Department of Justice originated in the Committee on Retrenchment, "a joint committee of
the two houses to find ways of reducing government expenditures." Cummings & McFarland,
Federal Justice, supra, at 223.
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solicitors general-Benjamin Bristow who served from 1870 to 1872, and
Samuel Phillips, who served from 1872 to 1885 (longer than any other
solicitor general)-probably functioned mainly as the attorney general's
chief deputy, with no particular responsibility for any one phase of the
attorney general's work. His duties were not narrowly defined, as they
are today, as the chief, or indeed (acting under supervision of the attor-
ney general) exclusive Supreme Court litigator for the United States.
Several facts support this general conclusion.
First, far from having the near monopoly enjoyed by their modem
counterparts over Supreme Court litigation, early solicitors general
shared this responsibility in about equal portions with the attorneys gen-
eral and with the assistant attorneys general.
These early trends-and the extent to which special counsel were
displaced by regular government counsel after the creation of the Office
of Solicitor General--can be seen, I think, from the following statistics.
In the Supreme Court's unusually heavy December 1866 term (71 U.S.
and 72 U.S.) (volumes 5 and 6 of Wallace's Reports), some 24 cases were
argued by the attorney general, either alone or with the help of an assis-
tant, and roughly five cases by the attorney general with the help of what
appears to have been outside counsel. Another 16 cases were argued
alone by assistants to the attorney general and two by special counsel,
also arguing alone.2" In the 1867 term [73 U.S. (7 Wall.)], there were
about 13 cases argued by the attorney general, some with help from as-
sistants; and, as it appears from the reports, another 4 with help from
special counsel. Nine additional cases were argued by the attorney gen-
eral's assistants, and two by special counsel arguing alone. The Decem-
ber 1868 term showed a similar pattern: 18 cases argued by the attorney
general and/or his assistants, four by special counsel (two with the attor-
ney general and two without). There was an apparent increase in the use
of special counsel in the 1869 term [76 U.S. and part of 77 U.S. (9 and 10
Wall.)], when 18 cases were argued by the attorney general and/or his
assistants, and 15 with some apparent involvement of outside counsel.
The picture begins to change a bit in the December 1870 term [the
latter portion of 77 U.S. and all of 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)], when the solicitor
general first appeared on the scene.
The nature of the change can be best understood against the back-
ground of a fundamental difference between 19th century oral arguments
and today's experience. Today the sharing of arguments by several law-
20. These statistics are somewhat debatable because it is not always possible to tell from
either the U.S. Reports or the Lawyers' Edition Reports whether certain individuals were
arguing as special counsel or as assistants to the Attorney General.
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yers representing the same client is virtually non-existent I cannot recall
a single occasion when that ever happened during my four years as solici-
tor general. A hundred years ago, however, arguments lasted for many
hours, sometimes days, and dividing the oral presentation for a single
client was common. (The Court still hears divided arguments, but the
oral advocates represent different clients.) I count only two cases during
the 1870 term where special counsel assisted, as compared with 13 cases
argued by the new solicitor general, Mr. Bristow (three by Bristow alone,
five shared with Attorney General Ackerman, and five shared with Assis-
tant Attorneys General). Another seven cases were argued by the Attor-
ney General and/or the assistant attorneys general without the solicitor
general's involvement. In the December 1871 term [80-81 U.S. (13-14
Wall.)], Mr. Bristow came more into his own, arguing some 26 cases [7
solo, 5 with the attorney general and 15 with the assistant attorneys gen-
eral]. Special counsel was used only once that term. In the December
1872 term [82 through part of 84 U.S. (15-17 Wall.)], (the last of the
December term, 1873 being the first of the October terms), there is no
trace of special counsel in the reports, but Bristow, too, was gone, and his
successor, Samuel F. Phillips had been in office only long enough to ar-
gue some 7 cases. The attorney general and his assistants carried the
load that term, with some 30 arguments among them.
These numbers seem to show that at least in these very early days
the solicitor general, while an actor of some importance in the Supreme
Court, shared the honors to a greater degree than we have come to ex-
pect today with the attorney general and the assistant attorneys general.
Moreover, a quick spot-check of the records of the government's briefs
and motions in the Supreme Court in the late 1800's and early 1900's
reveals a surprising number of submissions bearing the names of attor-
neys general or assistant attorneys general and not the Solicitors General.
It appears not to have been standard practice to stamp the imprimatur of
the solicitor general on all submissions until roughly the 1920's, judging
by a very unscientific survey of the old, dusty books in the Justice De-
partment's attic.
The different relationship of attorney general to Solicitor General is
also reflected, I believe, in the $7500 salary. During the term immedi-
ately preceding Bristow's appointment, the government paid $6000 for
outside counsel. Thus, it is fair to infer a congressional anticipation that
this new man at the Justice Department would have responsibilities other
than Supreme Court litigation. And thus it came to pass. In 1871, Bris-
tow went to Oxford, Mississippi, to help prosecute Klu Klux Klan mem-
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bers under the Enforcement Act of 1870.21 These prosecutions were
apparently very important in combating the terrorism of the Klan at a
time when state authorities in the South were powerless to do so, as is
reflected by the fact that the task was vested personally in the Justice
Department's second ranking law officer.
Today, the distinction between the attorney general and the solicitor
general is much more cleanly defined. It has been defined by 115 years of
history, and also by formal Department of Justice regulation. Neither in
1870, nor in any subsequent enactment, has Congress ever specified any
Supreme Court litigation responsibilities-nor any other responsibili-
ties-for the solicitor general. Then as now, he is required to be learned
in the law22 and has the general responsibility to assist the attorney gen-
eral but is given no statutory responsibility.
One hundred and fifteen years of history have pretty well taken the
attorney general out of the business of arguing cases for the United States
in the Supreme Court, and have vested that responsibility exclusively in
the solicitor general, subject to whatever supervision the attorney general
wants to assert. But those same 115 years have also preserved the origi-
nal basic relationship between the two. The solicitor general does what
he does in the context of assisting the attorney general, who has the stat-
utory responsibility for all litigation on behalf of the United States, and
who was arguing cases in the Supreme Court eight decades before there
was a solicitor general of the United States.
21. See Cummings & McFarland, Federal Justice, supra, at 235-236. Bristow apparently
undertook this task at some personal risk. Drawing upon his experience there, he later advised
the United States Attorney in North Carolina that "Itihe higher the social standing and char-
acter of the convicted party, the more important is a vigorous prosecution and prompt execu-
tion of judgment." Id. at 237.
22. "You will note that the Solicitor General is required by statute to be learned in the
law. This was true of the Attorney General as well under the Act of 1789 creating that office;
but curiously enough when the Solicitor General came into being in 1870, the requirement of
legal learning on the part of the Attorney General was dispensed with, and no longer appeared
in the statutes. It is reassuring, however, that the impetus of earlier statutory law has prevailed
and the Attorneys General have remained learned in the law regardless of statute." Fahy,
"The Office of the Solicitor General," 28 American Bar Assn. Journal 20 (1942).
Judge Fahy, who was the Solicitor General from 1941-45, also remarked that the great
variety of legal questions that come to the Solicitor General "should insure that, regardless of
his legal learning at the time of entry upon his duties, a reasonably attentive Solicitor General
should be 'learned in the law' if he remains very long in office." Id. at 22.
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